INTRODUCTION
The President of the Business Roundtable once infamously said that " [c] orporations were never designed to be democracies . . ."
1 American courts respectfully disagree and have repeatedly held that the democratic rights of shareholders are sacrosanct. 2 The context for the Business Roundtable President's comment was the battle over say on pay-a battle the Business ("This Court has repeatedly stated that, if the stockholders are not satisfied with the management or actions of their elected representatives on the board of directors, the power of corporate democracy is available to the stockholders to replace the incumbent directors when they stand for re-election."); see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) ("[M] anagement has attempted to . . . perpetuat[e] itself in office; and, to that end, for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest against management. These are inequitable purposes, contrary to established principles of corporate democracy."); Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995) ("This Court has been and remains assiduous in its concern about defensive actions designed to thwart the essence of corporate democracy by disenfranchising stockholders."). CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:431 Roundtable lost in the United States with the passage of the financial reform legislation known as Dodd-Frank. 3 As I will explain in this piece, courts' robust conception of corporate democracy rights for shareholders should protect both shareholders' ability to have a say on pay and a say on politics. Say on pay is the practice in United States, among other nations, of mandating a non-binding shareholder vote on executive compensation at publicly traded firms. 4 A shareholders' say on politics does not yet exist in America. But theoretically, just as say on pay mandates shareholder democracy in the case of executive remuneration, say on politics would require shareholders to vote on corporate political spending. 5 Binding say on politics votes already exist in the U.K. 6 Critiques of say on pay and say on politics have been couched as constitutional objections based on either the Tenth or First Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. But at their heart, these objections seem less rooted in the text of the Constitution and more inspired by a cribbed conception of shareholders' corporate voting rights. To untangle who has the stronger legal argument requires a review of how American courts have conceptualized "corporate democracy." I conclude that as framed by key courts such as the U.S. Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Delaware state courts, "corporate democracy" is a capacious enough concept to justify both shareholders' say on pay and say on politics.
PART I. CORPORATE DEMOCRACY
In contrast to the argument raised by some businessmen and academics that corporations are not democratic institutions, American courts have held repeatedly that an important aspect of American corporations are their procedures of corporate democracy. The phrase "corporate democracy" appears in Justice What Justice Kennedy meant by "procedures of corporate democracy" is not entirely self-evident as he neglected to provide a definition, but at the very least the quoted language above from Citizens United indicates that Justice Kennedy believes that shareholders' holding corporate managers accountable for their political spending is appropriate. Typically the way that shareholders hold managers accountable is through voting their proxy card at an annual or special meeting of shareholders.
As a matter of background, on a typical corporate proxy card there are four items that are subject to a shareholder vote on an annual basis: (1) the election of directors, (2) the appointment of auditors/accountants, (3) management proposals and (4) shareholder proposals. 9 As will be explained in more detail below, shareholders in publicly traded firms now have the right to vote on a fifth category of executive compensation. 10 And each of these five categories are properly a subject of "corporate democracy. " While Justice Kennedy used the term "corporate democracy" without providing a clear definition in Citizens United, other cases have articulated what the Supreme Court means by the phrase "corporate democracy. " In 1964 in Borak, the Supreme Court noted that federal securities laws are meant to empower corporate democracy or what the Court referred to as 7. There are two aspects of the Citizens United decision. The decision is five to four on the issue of lifting the ban on corporate expenditures in federal elections and the decision is eight to one in favor of requiring transparency of money in politics.
8. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010). 9. Sample Proxy Card, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxymatters/proxy_ sample.htm (last visited March 29, 2015) .
10. Dodd-Frank Section 951(a)(2); Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. §78n-1(a)(2 Admittedly, directors occupy a place of primacy in U.S. corporate governance. 15 Nonetheless, the way directors get their authority within the corporate structure is through shareholder elections. Akin to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Delaware courts have been quite protective of the ability of shareholders to vote for new directors. 16 As one of the lower courts in Delaware noted, "shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 11. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) ("The section stemmed from the congressional belief that '[f]air corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange.'") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383 , at 13 (1934 Meanwhile, the influential D.C. Circuit Court, which reviews many of the federal rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC), has also had the opportunity to flesh out what it means by the concept of "corporate democracy" in the context of SEC Rule 14a, which governs corporate proxies at public firms. 22 The D.C. Circuit's views of corporate democracy includes the following iterations:
It is obvious to the point of banality to restate the proposition that Congress intended by its enactment of section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to give true vitality to the concept of corporate democracy. The depth of this commitment is reflected in the strong language employed in the legislative history:
Even those who in former days managed great corporations were by reason of their personal contacts with their shareholders constantly aware of their responsibilities. But as management became divorced from ownership and came under the control of banking groups, men forgot that they were dealing with the savings of men and the making of profits became an impersonal thing. When men do not know the victims of their aggression they are not always conscious of their wrongs . . . . Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange.
23
The language above appeared in a case where shareholders at Dow 24 used a shareholder resolution to try to implore the firm to stop producing the chemical weapon napalm for the Vietnam War. 25 As the SEC Historical Society sums up the matter, "a shareholder of Dow Chemical sought inclusion in the company's right to vote their shares or unnecessarily frustrating them in their attempt to obtain representation on the board of directors.").
22 1950s and 1960s , shareholders began to display increasing concern over the corporation's relationship to society at large. Issues such as the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, and environmentalism became important not merely on the political agenda, but also on the corporate agenda. Shareholders began to use the corporate proxy to debate these issues.").
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proxy of a request to corporate directors for the company to stop selling napalm to any buyer unless there was a reasonable assurance that the product would not be used against any human being. Dow refused to include the statement and the SEC declined to take action to force the inclusion." 26 This led to the shareholders suing the SEC.
In the Dow case, the D.C. Circuit expounded upon the rights of shareholders in publicly traded firms under SEC Rule 14a to vote on political and social issues through shareholder resolutions on corporate proxy cards. As the Court explicated:
We think that there is a clear and compelling distinction between management's legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in matters of day-to-day business judgment, and management's patently illegitimate claim of power to treat modern corporations with their vast resources as personal satrapies implementing personal political or moral predilections.
27
This case proved to be a watershed moment for increasing the scope of permissible shareholder proposals.
28
Shortly thereafter, the SEC changed Rule 14a-8 to allow for shareholder proposals on social and political matters.
29
In 1992, the D.C. Circuit Court noted that shareholders also have a right to an informed vote. As the court declared,
In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to the manner in which his interests are being served, it is essential that he be enlightened not only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also as to the major questions of policy, which are decided at stockholders' meetings. 31 These courts indicate that shareholders have the right to vote on who will represent them on the board of directors of Delaware corporations; they have a right to vote on social and political policies at publicly traded firms; and in either case, they have a right to sufficient information to cast an informed vote on the corporate proxy card.
PART II. SAY ON PAY
Given that American courts have embraced a broad notion of shareholder suffrage, how will this apply to say on pay or say on politics? Before we can answer that question, I must define what say on pay and say on politics are. I will begin with say on pay.
How CEOs are paid matters. As economist Dr. Susan Holmberg explained for the Roosevelt Institute, executive compensation packages may incentivize dangerously risky behavior that can impact the soundness of the entire market. As she argues, " [e] conomists are increasingly concerned that the structure of executive compensation encourages CEOs to engage in behavior that is economically inefficient in the long run, unreasonably risky, or even fraudulent, which can be harmful to companies, shareholders, and the economy at large." 33 The issue of extraordinarily high executive compensation has been in the crosshairs of corporate governance fights for years. /why-we-need-tolimit-executive-compensationbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financialadvice ("[W] ith such U.S. exalted compensation, management has so elevated itself above average employees as to have become, in my opinion, a constituency unto itself-and one that, to compound the inequity, largely sets its own compensation.").
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As Say on pay is the ability of shareholders to vote on executive compensation packages on the corporate proxy card. Say on pay is a policy that has been adopted by multiple nations around the globe, 38 originating in the U.K., the Netherlands and Australia before it finally arrived in America. 39 The policy comes in two basic flavors: advisory or binding. The Netherlands and Switzerland have binding say on pay votes that managers must heed. 40 In other countries such as Australia, Norway, Spain, [T] here is no single policy for implementing 'say on pay' that is uniformly adopted across countries. Models of 'say on pay' vary considerably in terms of whom they address (boards of directors or named executives), their objective (the compensation philosophy or compensation levels), their restrictiveness (binding or advisory), and their catalyst (legal mandate or market-driven pressure)."). Say on pay votes remind corporate managers of their fiduciary duty to shareholders and to help mitigate the classic agency problem of managers' prerequisite consumption identified so long ago by Professors Berle and Means. 43 With a vote on executive compensation, shareholders can express their displeasure (or pleasure) with how executives are being paid.
Say on pay was first suggested by shareholders in the United States who were concerned by the skyrocketing size of executive compensation packages which became larded with stock options, generous retirement packages and even golden parachutes for leaving the job. 44 Finally, many shareholders viewed board compensation committees as being captured by powerful CEOs who could subtly, or not so subtly, influence the setting of his or her own compensation rates. th Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1 (2013), http://fas.org/sgp /crs/misc/R43262.pdf ("The CEO's pay is typically a combination of base pay, an annual bonus tied to performance, grants of stock, stock options, contributions to a retirement program, and various benefits such as the use of limousines and club memberships, and it is formally set by the company's board of directors.").
45. Ian Gregory-Smith et al., CEO Pay and Voting Dissent Before and After the Crisis, 124 ECON. J. F22, F22 (2014) ("Say on pay involves the direct empowerment of shareholders in the determination of executive compensation arrangements in their company. This move rests, explicitly or implicitly, on some version of the 'rents capture' hypothesis of corporate control. That is, the proposition . . . suggests that executives 'capture' their boards sufficiently to push their own rewards beyond purely marketdetermined levels. It is consequently assumed that self-interested shareholders will, if offered a low-cost opportunity to voice their concerns, vote to punish excess and that executives, fearful of such retribution, will curtail their own opportunism. 
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Union pension funds were some of the institutional investors that raised the issue of executive compensation earliest. 46 A say on pay vote was first suggested in shareholder proposal by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), investors who were self-consciously copying the U.K.'s say on pay approach. 47 Shareholders were frequently concerned with the growing disconnect between pay and performance 48 after CEOs (and other top managers) continued to be paid generously while leading particular firms into bankruptcy or other financial ruin. 49 As one reporter put it during the 2008 financial crisis, " [ The inflection point for say on pay in the United States came in the guise of the $700 billion taxpayer funded bailout of the financial system through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (commonly known as TARP) legislation in 2008. Many TARP bailout recipients paid large year-end bonuses. This was a bridge too far for many members of Congress. As part of TARP, a condition for receipt of federal bailout dollars was shareholder votes on executive compensation packages as the result of 2009 supplemental legislation. 53 Furthermore, TARP recipients were also subject to executive compensation packages that were set by the so-called "Pay Czar" Kenneth Feinberg, who was highly critical of CEO perks including large bonuses 
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far beyond TARP recipients to all publicly traded companies.
56
Congress agreed and integrated the reform into Dodd-Frank.
57
Mohandas Gandhi is (mis)credited with declaring, "[f]irst they ignore you. Then they laugh at you. Then they attack you. Then you win." 58 This quote, whether Gandhi's or not, seems to capture a trajectory say on pay took in the past decade in the United States.
Before it was the law of the land in America, the approach of empowering shareholders with a say on executive pay was the subject of considerable consternation. Say on pay was a departure from the American corporate law that preceded it, because before this, shareholders typically had no input on board decisions to spend corporate resources.
59
At first the idea of a shareholder vote on executive compensation in America was met with dismissive derision. Then-CEO of Apple, Steve Jobs joked, "I hope 'Say on Pay' will help me with my $1 a year salary." 60 The year he made this joke, Mr. Jobs exercised over $14 million in Apple stock options and had a private jet that was subsidized by Apple. ("[S] hareholders' rights in U.S. public firms are significantly weaker relative to the U.K. and other common law countries. In addition to introducing advisory say-on-pay votes, it is important to strengthen shareholder rights in a number of other ways.").
57. Dodd-Frank Section 951(a)(2); Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. §78n-1(a)(2).
58. Eoin O'Carroll, Political misquotes: The 10 most famous things never actually said, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 3, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/ 2011/0603/Political-misquotes-The-10-most-famous-things-never-actually-said/First-theyignore-you.-Then-they-laugh-at-you.-Then-they-attack-you.-Then-you-win.-MohandasGandhi.
59. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 277 (Del. 2008) (holding that stockholder initiated bylaws cannot mandate how the board should decide a specific substantive question; rather they can merely define the process and procedure by which the board makes its decisions. 65. Kiviat, supra note 47 ("IBM says there's no way that shareholders can know what's an appropriate pay practice since they're not privy to competitive information like which executives are receiving other job offers. Coca-Cola stresses that shareholders already have a way to deal with pay practices they find unpalatable: don't vote for members of the board when they come up for re-election."). 
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proxy cards of publicly traded firms more frequently, the reaction by critics became more pointedly negative. 69 Compensation consultants who advise boards about setting executive pay complained in the press. Some of the objections to say on pay displayed a deep discomfort with shareholder democracy. For example, Frederic W. Cook, an executive compensation consultant, argued that say on pay was "unnecessary and potentially harmful . . . . He [wa]s also concerned that say on pay could provide an opening to shareholders who want to muscle in on the corporate agenda and lead to shareholder 'plebiscites' on other issues." 70 Here Mr. Cook raised a classic slippery slope argument that if say on pay were allowed, there would be no logical stopping point to what else might end up on a corporate proxy card for a vote.
When say on pay was being considered in Congress as potential new federal law, certain CEOs themselves started pushing back, arguing that requiring say on pay at all public firms would be unnecessary and overly broad. CEOs interviewed by USA Today before Dodd-Frank became law had a litany of warnings against say on pay. 71 William Lauder, CEO of The Estée Lauder Cos. argued "that passing say on pay would require all companies to pay for the sins of a few: 'I can only say that the cost to an organization for complying with the extraordinary rules and regulations that are largely driven from the unfortunate existence of bad actors is enormous . . . . '" 72 Thus, he worried that regulation could be improperly tailored and expensive.
The CEO lobbying group, the Business Roundtable, complained to Congress in 2007 when one of the earlier say on pay bills was being debated, "[c]orporations were never designed to be democracies. . . . While shareholders own a corporation, they don't run it . . . ." 73 Two years later, the organization had not changed its tune. In Congressional testimony in 2009, the President of Business Roundtable did not accept that any corporate governance changes were needed in reaction to the 2008 economic crash. He stated, "[a]t the outset, we must respectfully take issue with the premise that corporate governance was a significant cause of the current financial crisis. . . . Some of the current corporate governance proposals, including a universal 'say-on-pay' right . . . may actually exacerbate the emphasis on short-term gains."
74
When Dodd-Frank was in the process of being passed through Congress, Congressman Shelby complained about the say on pay provisions in the bill's Conference Report. He said, "Main Street corporations will be subject to a panoply of new corporate governance and executive compensation requirements. These new requirements will be costly and potentially harmful to shareholders because they empower special interests and encourage short-term thinking by managers." 75 The only constitutional argument raised against say on pay was 2015] .
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critique is rooted in the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, which states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively . . . ." 78 In other words, where a power has not specifically been given to the Congress, the Tenth Amendment reserves residual power to the 50 states.
Thus the argument goes, power to regulate the internal affairs of corporations should be left with each state. As former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman Veasey, framed the issue:
A number of post-Sarbanes-Oxley developments in the federal arena also raise significant federalism questions . . . . A bill requiring a stockholder advisory vote on executive compensation (the 'Say on Pay' bill) that recently passed . . . raises the question of whether and to what extent regulation of executive compensation should be federalized . . . .
79
As Professor Steven Bainbridge put his Tenth Amendment argument pre-Dodd-Frank's enactment: "Legislation that 'fixes' a nonexistent problem by upsetting basic principles of federalism ought to be a nonstarter. Unfortunately, the executive compensation debate has become so thoroughly bollixed up with issues of class warfare and financial populism that rational arguments seem to fall on deaf ears." Preemption, which is governed by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, means that when a federal law and a state law conflict, the federal law controls. 84 Despite all of these objections and predictions of doom, say on pay became the law of the land in the United States in 2010. Technically there are three distinct aspects of this part of the voluminous Dodd-Frank law: (1) say on pay, (2) say on frequency and (3) say on parachutes. The say on frequency votes allow shareholders to vote on how frequently they want to hold say on pay votes (annually, biannually or triennially). 85 At least so far, most shareholders have elected to hold say on pay votes on an annual basis. 86 Say on parachutes allows shareholder votes on certain golden parachutes for executives.
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companies must conduct a shareholder vote 'to approve the compensation of executives.' 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1). However, these 'say-on-pay' votes 'shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an issuer . . . . '" 88 Under Dodd-Frank, shareholders are able to vote on the top five executives' compensation packages as a group, which makes it impossible for shareholders to clearly object to a particular pay package for a particular executive. 89 Furthermore the vote is precatory-that is non-binding. But say on pay does give shareholders the ability to signal to management in a broad way that they approve or disapprove of management's general approach to executive compensation.
Thus far, the federalism argument against say on pay has not been litigated post-Dodd-Frank's enactment. But Congress is on firm Commerce Clause ground 90 when it regulates publicly traded companies whose stocks are bought and sold in interstate commerce. 91 And even the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledges that while Dodd-Frank "mandates 90. Fisch, supra note 4, at 737-38 ("Any concern about congressional authority to regulate corporations has long been put to rest. Under the increasingly liberal interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress' power is understood to be very broad, and clearly corporations (even very small ones) affect interstate commerce sufficiently to allow broad federal oversight. So is say on pay working? Dodd-Frank say on pay votes started four years ago in 2011 and at the vast majority of firms, executive compensation packages have been approved. 95 Indeed, in the first year, shareholders voted down executive compensation packages only 1.6% of the time.
96 This is not particularly surprising as individual shareholders will hold relatively smaller percentages of any given firm, 97 and thus achieving a promanagement majority vote is typical. 
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But notably, several high profile firms have experienced no votes on say on pay. 99 The reasons for each negative vote is rooted in the performance of each firm as well as their shareholders' disenchantment. 100 Citigroup made headlines when it experienced a negative say on pay vote in 2012. 101 That year both major proxy advisory services, the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis & Co., recommended a no vote on Citigroup's compensation packages. 102 In particular, certain investors viewed Citigroup's CEO Vikram Pandit's compensation as generous pay for mediocre performance. 103 Some firms have changed their pay practices in order to avoid a no vote. 104 This happened at Disney in 2011. Shareholders and CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:431 the proxy advisory service ISS objected to Disney's practice of tax gross ups for top managers, which are sometimes characterized as a perk on a perk. 105 This objection was communicated to Disney before the final executive compensation package was sent out to shareholders for the say on pay vote. Disney got the message loud and clear and decided to remove the tax gross ups. When the executive compensation package was sent to shareholders (sans tax gross ups), they approved it.
106
The Citigroup no vote (among other no votes) 107 and the removal of tax gross ups at Disney are both signs that say on pay has some real teeth and is a way for shareholders to communicate with internal managers about high executive remuneration.
108
While mandatory say on pay votes are relatively new in the United States, studies have shown that say on pay can impact executive compensation when there are coordinated no-vote campaigns among investors. 109 One empirical study of say on pay votes found that the proxy advisory firm ISS's voting recommendations were quite influential in voting outcomes. 109. Ertimur et al., supra note 46, at 576 ("[W] ith respect to the consequences of compensation-related activism, we document a $7.3 million reduction in CEO total pay (corresponding to a 38% decrease) for firms with excess CEO pay targeted by vote-no campaigns. As for shareholder proposals, we find evidence of a moderating effect on CEO pay-a $2.3 million reduction-only in firms with excess CEO pay targeted by proposals sponsored by institutional proponents and calling for a better link between pay and performance.").
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Another more qualitative study found no votes stemmed from poor pay for performance at a given firm. 111 Finally, a 39 country comparison by the Federal Reserve found that say on pay reduced CEO pay. 112 The hour may be too early for either side to declare victory in the United States as a matter of efficacy.
113 But one thing is clear, say on pay fits within the broad protection of shareholder voting rights that Delaware and other American courts including the U.S. Supreme Court have embraced, should Dodd-Frank's say on pay's legality be challenged.
PART III. SAY ON POLITICS
Now that the United States has say on pay, could the United States adopt say on politics in the near future? Post-Citizens United, several academics have urged the adoption of legislation that would provide a say on politics to protect shareholders from managers' spending corporate resources on politics. 114 As the Professor John C. Coates IV has indicated that publiclytraded corporations' political spending raises risks that investors should be mindful of. As he argues: "political activity creates distinct and difficult-to-model risks. Dozens of studies . . . support the view that political activity can harm shareholder interests. These harms can flow through many channels-from reputational harm to dilution of strategic focus, from politically risky acquisition bets or capital investments to state laws deterring takeovers." 116 Thus, corporate political spending raises similar risks of managerial shrinking and self-dealing as high executive compensation and should be of similar concern to investors.
Professor Pamela Karlan explained, a year after Citizens United, "[t]hat corporate managers might spend corporate funds not to maximize the shareholders' welfare but to maximize their own is a very real danger." 117 Thus she indicated that corporate politicking raises a classic agency problem for investors. Or as the late Professor Ronald Dworkin contended, " [m] any of the shareholders who will actually pay for the [corporate political] ads, who in many cases are members of pension and union funds, will hate the opinions they pay to advertise." Consequently, Professor Dworkin urged, "Congress should also require that any corporation that wished to engage in electioneering obtain at least the annual consent of its stockholders to that activity and to a proposed budget for it, and that the required disclosure in an ad report the percentage of stockholders who have refused that 124 but so far, these bills have not progressed in the legislative process.
125 Bills to provide shareholder approval of corporate political budgets have also been introduced in several states, but so far none has become law. 126 One bill in Connecticut to empower shareholders passed the legislature, but was vetoed by the governor. 127 Maryland, among other states, is in the process of considering say on politics legislation as this piece is being written. 128 Say on politics, like say on pay, originated in the U.K. 129 Say on politics under the U.K. Companies Act requires shareholders to vote on political budgets that are proposed by managers over a one to four year period. 130 If the budget is not approved by shareholders, then the company is not authorized to spend money on politics, and moreover, the directors are personally liable to the company for any unauthorized political spending. 131 The U.K.
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Companies Act also provides disclosure of corporate political spending to shareholders. 132 The Shareholder Protection Act that has been introduced in Congress mirrors the U.K. Companies Act and would apply to publicly traded firms. 133 The International Corporate Governance Network considers the U.K.'s say on politics to be a best practice. 134 They argue:
Shareholders should be able to vote on a company's political donations policy, preferably through a company-proposed resolution or, secondly, through a shareholder resolution. Shareholders should be able to vote on the maximum amount of company donations for political purposes. Shareholders also should be in a position to vote on material changes to the company's donations policy. 143 Congressman Spencer Bachus warned that the Shareholder Protection Act "is a serious departure from the long-established premise of primacy of state corporate law." 144 Say on politics has inspired a similar objection to say on pay that it would be inappropriate for the federal government to regulate the internal affairs of corporations. This was a weak argument against say on pay and it isn't any more robust when raised against say on politics. Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress can displace conflicting state laws through preemption so long as it is regulating using an enumerated power. 145 Here the enumerated power is still the Commerce Clause Power. 146 As the Congressional Research Service noted in its report entitled, Legislative Options After Citizens United v. FEC: Thus the nonpartisan research arm for Congress indicates that say on politics is realistically within the Congress's Commerce Clause Power. 148 Some critics have raised the possibility that say on politics could offend the First Amendment. 149 For instance, the American Legislative Exchange Council (better known as ALEC), has specifically lobbied against say on politics bills in New York State deploying this argument. 150 Citizens United dispatches this First Amendment argument, endorsing corporate accountability to shareholders and shareholder democracy in the context of corporate political spending. Moreover, as the Citizens United majority held:
Shareholders can determine whether their corporation's political speech advances the corporation's interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are "'in the pocket' of so-called moneyed interests." The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.
151
Lower courts have not fully addressed the issue yet, since shareholder approval of corporate political spending has not been adopted in any part of the United States and consequently there has yet to be a live case or controversy to litigate. Nonetheless, shareholder protection rationales have been raised in other cases involving disclosure of corporate political spending and board 2015] .
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approval of corporate political spending. 152 But the language of Citizens United, as well as language from the Delaware Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit, should help inform courts considering these reforms to uphold them in the name of robust shareholder suffrage rights.
CONCLUSION
Say on pay became federal law despite a barrage of criticism from corporate lobbies, among others, that made arguments that say on pay violated federalism under the Tenth Amendment. This objection is being lobbed against the post-Citizens United legislation that would provide shareholders a say on politics. Congress would be on firm constitutional ground in regulating say on politics at public firms by exercising its Commerce Clause power.
The other constitutional objection to say on politics is that it offends the First Amendment. This argument is put to rest by a careful reading of the Citizens United decision, which envisions a robust role for shareholders in checking the potential excesses of corporate managers in political expenditures.
The heart of the objections to say on pay and say on politics is not that either approach is actually unconstitutional. Rather the gravamen of the argument against say on pay and say on politics is that these approaches empower shareholders, which for some corporate insiders upsets their normative view of the proper balance of power between day to day managers and beneficial owners. These objections exhibit a deep distrust of shareholder democracy. Fortunately for shareholders, the most important sources of law, the U.S. Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit Court, and the Delaware Supreme Court, disagree and endorse strong shareholder voting rights, including informed shareholder votes on political matters within the corporate structure. 
